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Summary. When Apple Store was launched, there were 500 applications available for 
iPhone users. Since then, the number of applications in the App Store skyrocketed and in 
2017 reached around 2.2 million. In recent years, the number of apps in the App Store 
is steadily declining, due to Apple’s decision to remove old apps that do not function or 
the apps that do not follow current app guidelines. The distribution of the apps is only 
available through the App Store, where the only available payment processor is controlled 
by Apple. That places Apple in a unique position.
The case Epic Games v. Apple raises a broader discussion, whether Apple as the “ga-
tekeeper” of Apps can restrict distribution and access to the apps in the iOS operational 
system, and whether that kind of activity can be deemed as a monopolist and restrictive 
competition in App distribution market. This paper will analyze and critically evaluate 
the recent lawsuit that was brought up against Apple by Epic Games. The main aspect of 
this analysis is whether Apple can legally restrict the developer’s ability to distribute the 
applications through the App Store and if it does not restrict the competition. 
This article is composed of several chapters. Chapter one will examine the relevant 
facts of the Epic and Apple lawsuit and will summarize the key arguments of this case. 
The second chapter will explore the relevant legislation and the relevant market related to 
previously mention proceedings and will explain how the doctrine of the essential facility 
might affect the case. Chapter three will delve into similar cases brought up earlier and 
will cover the distribution of digital goods. Chapter four will provide conclusions and the 
paths moving forward.
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The object of the paper is to perform a detailed analysis of the case. The purpose of the 
paper is an assessment of the relevant facts and legal framework regarding Epic’s claim, as 
well as analyze the topics of foreclosure and dominance in the market. To write this paper 
several academic writing methods such as descriptive to provide readers with relevant 
legislation and inform them about relevant facts of the case, also analytical to form the 
readers’ opinions regarding the recent events and activities of both sides of the suit, also a 
comparative to compare different legal frameworks in the United States of America and 
European Union regarding the regulation of monopoly were used. There is no doubt this 
topic has enormous relevance because of its’ possible after-effects. Epic’s claim already has 
an impact not only on Apple but also on the whole app development and distribution 
industry of digital goods and might create a precedent to the similar cases. Currently, this 
claim is only discussed in the media, and there is no precedent. This article will not give 
a clear answer to how this lawsuit will be resolved, because it mainly depends on court 
interpretation of the relevant market. We would rather give a few alternative solutions 
to this case.
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1. Merits of the Case
Epic Games, Inc. is an American video game and software developer located in Cary, 
North Carolina. The company is best known for the video game Fortnite, where the 
player is transported to a post-apocalyptic, zombie-infested world, which has been re-
leased in July 2017 and has 350 million players across the globe. On the morning of 
August 13, 2020, Epic Games released an update of the previously mentioned game and 
implemented a new feature for users to purchase V-Bucks (Fortnite’s electronic curren-
cy) bypassing Apple’s payment system. They added a direct payment option to Fortnite 
for iOS users, giving players the option to use Epic’s direct payment system instead of 
using Apple’s payment processor.
Rather than tolerate this, Apple responded by removing the Fortnite game from the 
App Store. Also, Apple cut off Epic’s access to all development tools necessary to create 
software for Apple’s platforms – including for the Unreal Engine which is also contro-
lled by Epic. Apple has never claimed Unreal Engine violated Apple policy. Millions of 
developers rely on the Unreal Engine to develop software, and hundreds of millions of 
consumers use it. Therefore, Apple is attacking not only Fortnite but the entire Epic’s 
business.
After Apple’s actions, Epic Games filed the complaint for injunctive relief to the 
United States District Court Northern District Of California. Sometime after the Epic 
claim, Apple countersued. On October 9th, 2020, the Court issued the order partly 
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granting and denying a motion for preliminary injunction stating that Epic Games 
bears the burden in asking for such extraordinary relief. Also, the court order stated 
that Apple is enjoined from taking adverse action against the Epic Affiliates concerning 
restricting, suspending, or terminating the Epic Affiliates from Apple’s Developer Pro-
gram. This preliminary injunction shall remain in effect during this litigation unless the 
Epic Affiliates breach any of their governing agreements with Apple, or the operative 
App Store guidelines. Given the novelty and the magnitude of the issues, as well as the 
debate in both the academic community and society at large, the Court is unwilling to 
tilt the playing field in favor of one party or the other with an early ruling of the like-
lihood of success on the merits. 
1.1. Raised arguments relating the App Store
First of all, it is important to mention that this case concerns Apple’s practices in two 
main markets:
i) the distribution of software applications (“apps”);
Table No 1. The main arguments and counterrarguments
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ii) the processing of consumers’ payments for digital content used within iOS mo-
bile apps (“in-app content”). 
Therefore, these are the main aspects of the case that will be analyzed in this paper. 
Epic claims that these markets should be understood as a single market where Apple 
acts as a monopolist. Apple argues that these markets are separate and believes the pro-
cessing of consumers’ payments is not inextricably linked with apps and is related to 
App Store functionality. Also, there are a lot of various arguments in the claim and 
counterclaim raised. The table below summarizes the main arguments stated in Epic’s 
claim and Apple’s counterclaim.
As the table shows, two main reasons for the disagreement could be raised. One of 
the reasons why Epic decided to sue Apple is the size of commission Apple takes. Every 
Table No. 2. Comparison of app development platforms
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transaction in App Store is done by Apple Pay, a payment processor which is control by 
Apple. Epic claims that Apple imposes unreasonable and unlawful restraints to com-
pletely monopolize both markets (mentioned above) and prevent software developers 
from reaching the over billion users of its mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and iPad) unless 
they go through a single store controlled by Apple, the App Store, where Apple exacts 
an oppressive (according to Epic) 30% tax on the sale of every app. As Epic stated, Apple 
also requires software developers who wish to sell digital in-app content to those con-
sumers to use a single payment processing option offered by Apple, In-App Purchase, 
which likewise carries a 30% tax. 
On the other hand, Apple is not the only platform that takes a commission from 
developers. The table below illustrates the differences and similarities of several app 
development platforms and the commission fees they take.
As the table indicates, Apple iOS is not the only platform that takes revenue cuts 
from developers. Apple differs developers according to the revenue they make. Google 
Play, another App Store of Android, and Play Station take the same “oppressive” (as Epic 
claims) 30% revenue cuts from all developers. Therefore, Apple is not the only platform 
that takes a commission. Google, PlayStation, and other platforms do the same. Apple 
has different criteria for app developers, so it could be concluded that the apple plat-
form should be considered more favorable for app developers in terms of price than 
other platforms. Therefore, it might seem that Epic’s argument about “oppressive” 30% 
tax is not quite right.
On the other hand, this situation rises a way more important question - whether the 
dispute is actually about the revenue cuts Apple takes. As Epic stated in the claim, they 
are not seeking monetary compensation and are concerned about allegedly monopo-
listic practices of Apple, especially its’ control over the essential facility and refusal of 
access to it. This means Epic should focus on proving the absence of alternatives and 
foreclosure.
Therefore, an analysis of whether Apple restricts access to the essential facility (rele-
vant market) will be covered further. Mentioned revenue cuts will be analyzed only as 
one of the criteria of the essential facility’s doctrine.
As mentioned earlier, the court stated Epic’s required preliminary injunctive relief 
is an extraordinary measure rarely granted. Epic’s lawsuit challenges the fundamental 
operation of digital platforms affecting millions of users. To resolve it, the Court must 
apply statutes enacted more than a century ago—to a technology context where lawyers 
and economists can merely hypothesize about the future of the digital frontier. While 
courts are charged with adjudicating cases of significant impact, they do so cautiously, 
and on full records, with the status quo intact. Therefore, a brief analysis of the main 
statutes related to competition law is needed.
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2. Definition of monopoly in the United States 
2.1. The legal framework of private antitrust litigation
The key pieces of antitrust legislation in the United States — the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914 (Sawyer, U.S. Antitrust Law, and Policy in 
Historical Perspective, 2019, p. 1). Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for 
any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations” (Supreme Court of the United States May 13, 
2019 ruling). In other words, ever since the enactment of the Sherman Act, protecting 
consumers from monopoly prices has been the central concern of antitrust (Supreme 
Court of the United States May 13, 2019 ruling).
Also, US antitrust laws provide a basis for a dual enforcement regime, which means 
not only governmental agencies such as The Department of Justice or Federal Trade 
Commission, can launch an investigation regarding the infringement of antitrust, but 
also the private entities can go to private litigation. 
The legal basis for commencing a private federal antitrust action is contained in the 
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15(a)) which states that “any person who shall be injured in 
his business or property because of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor in any district court of the United States”. The broad text of “any person” who 
has been “injured” by an antitrust violator may sue—readily covers consumers who 
purchase goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices from an allegedly mono-
polistic retailer (Supreme Court of the United States May 13, 2019 ruling). Therefore, 
Epic Games, Inc. is a legitimate claimant.
On the other hand, to bring an action, a party must have constitutional “standing”. 
Antitrust standing is limited to consumers and competitors in the relevant market and, 
as recognized by some courts, those whose injuries are “inextricably intertwined” with 
the alleged conduct. A claimant’s injury is “inextricably intertwined” with the alleged 
conduct if the claimant was directly targeted and its harm was “the essential component 
of [the defendant’s] anticompetitive scheme as opposed to an ancillary by-product of 
it.” (United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit November 12, 2015 ruling). 
The claimant has the initial burden to show an agreement in restraint of trade, and 
that the agreement produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within a relevant product 
and geographic market. The claimant can meet its burden on the latter by showing the 
existence of actual anticompetitive effects (such as reduced output, increased prices, or 
reduced quality), or by showing that the defendants possessed “market power”, that is, 
the ability to raise prices above those that would prevail in a competitive market. If the 
claimant makes this initial showing, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show 
that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective. If the 
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defendant rebuts, the burden returns to the claimant to show that the chosen restraint 
is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective (Saint-Antoine et al., 2019, 
page 7-8).
In the case under analysis, Apple’s actions allegedly harm millions of innocent con-
sumers worldwide — the players who enjoy Fortnite and other Epic games—which will 
sever their trust with Epic, a loss that is impossible to quantify. Because Apple has now 
removed Fortnite from the App Store, iOS users cannot receive updates and will soon 
be stranded in an outdated version of the game. This harm to Epic’s iOS customers will 
irreparably harm Epic’s goodwill and reputation, as Epic believes.
Besides, Apple’s retaliation represents an existential threat to Epic’s Unreal Engine. 
To retaliate against the suit, Apple decided to ban games using Epic’s Unreal Engine 
from its storefront. Providers of OS like Apple routinely make certain software and 
developer tools available to software developers, for free or a small fee, to enable the de-
velopment of software that will run on the OS. Apple intends to deny Epic access to that 
widely available material. Without that access, Epic could not develop future versions of 
the Unreal Engine for use on iOS. It affected developers who use the Unreal Engine on 
Apple products in many fields and it cannot be repaired with a monetary award. This is 
quintessential irreparable harm. Therefore, Epic’s injury is inextricably linked to Apple’s 
conduct aimed at restricting competition. On October 9th, 2020 the judge ruled against 
that ban. Yet, for a few months, the access was denied and the harm was suffered.
Moreover, Epic stated, that access to the iOS platform is an essential facility for app 
developers to reach more than a billion users (who are, as Epic states, relevant market) 
and conditioning that access on acquiescence not to compete against Apple in the In-
App Payment Processing Market maintains Apple’s monopoly there. 
2.2. Insights on the relevant mobile Apps market
In competition law, a relevant market is a market in which a particular product or 
service is sold. The first step in virtually any antitrust case is to define the relevant mar-
ket in which the competitive harm is alleged. A relevant market is a collection of goods 
or services that can profitably be sold at a monopoly price (McKenna, 2020, p. 2078). 
Market power can be proven in one of two ways: either by direct evidence of mar-
ket power by showing actual supra-competitive prices and restricted output or by cir-
cumstantial evidence of market power which shows that the defendant has a dominant 
share in a well-defined relevant market and that there are significant barriers to entry in 
that market (United States District Court, September 11, 2013 ruling). In this dispute, 
the Parties decided to describe a relevant market in two different ways.
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2.2.1. Narrow definition of relevant market
Epic describes a relevant market in three main aspects:
1. Apple is a monopolist in the relevant market, which could be defined as the App 
Store;
2. Apple’s practices are monopolistic since it contractually forbids developers to dis-
tribute iOS-compatible versions of their apps outside the App Store;
3. Apple holds a monopoly in the payment processing services market since it con-
tractually bonds developers to use Apple’s pre-installed processing service.
Useful indicators of monopoly power or the absence of such power include the size 
and competitive strengths of the defendant, its’ competitors, supra-competitive profit 
levels, barriers to competition in the industry that would thwart new entry or the ex-
pansion of existing competitors, and historical trends within the industry (Holmes, 
Mangiaracina, 2020, p. 367, 389).
The asset of economic assumptions rooted in the current antitrust thinking does 
not fit into the digital economy (Shili, S, 2020, p.8). Epic keeps in mind that, Apple’s 
platform is a two-sided business, where two sets of customers require each other for the 
creation of value (Jullien, 2005, p.4 & Bloodstein, 2020, p. 195) and the value to each 
side increases as more members participate on either side. The platform plays a crucial 
role in creating these indirect network effects (Edelman, 2015). App Stores facilitate the 
interaction between them in return for a fee, which consists of a percentage of the tran-
saction, charged to the developer (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 8), who includes this 
fee directly in the price that is paid by consumers. This “tax” means Apple often makes 
more money from a developer’s customer than from the developer (Financial Times, 
2020). Apple uses every tactic to protect this revenue source, firstly not informing the 
user about it. To support this claim, an example of Facebook could be given. Apple 
obligated Facebook to delete the notice that Apple takes 30% of App Store commission 
because it violates App Store’s policy by showing “irrelevant” information to users. By 
allowing implant direct payment measures in the apps like Fortnite., Apple’s payment 
processor would lose its competitive advantage.
According to Epic, Apple controls a critical gateway to the modern digital economy 
that is the only way for iOS users to legally download apps. By using users’ data, Apple 
has created the consumer-tailored ecosystem, where for iPhone users is impossible to 
switch to an alternative because the costs to switch for the alternative are over 50 times 
higher than a 5% app price increase. This is because Apple has been strategically desi-
gning their product portfolios and building up walls between ecosystems to increase 
switching costs and make it inconvenient. (Shili, 2020, p. 14). Only a few iOS users are 
prone to switch to other operational systems. In addition, digital platforms like the App 
store enjoy direct network effects, then users and app developers attract each other and 
vice versa (Zhu and Iansiti, 2019). 
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This effect creates enormous problems for developers, who want to change the status 
quo. To create the change, they need the critical mass of fellow developers and users, 
who probably face the additional cost and discomfort to quit App Store. If developers 
could create an alternative platform to get a benefit of the network effect, they would 
need to attract a critical mass of other developers and users to ensure the platform’s 
utility. (Shili, 2020, p.20). This specific concern for two-sided platforms creates an en-
vironment where the market’s efficiency, at least in digital markets, is maximized with 
only a few firms, each seeking control of the market. 
According to this point of view, the relevant market that suffers due to lack of com-
petition is all Apple Store consumers. First and foremost, they have to endure Apple 
commissions from every transaction, that is passed from the developers and experience 
a platform innovation regarding the in-app payments. An iOS user can’t get an app 
from the outside App Store unless she/he decides to change the iPhone to a phone 
which has a different operating system. As well, the ability to make in-app purchases, 
only with Apple controlled payment processor denies a choice for consumers of an in-
app provider. According to Epic, Apple has absolute control not only of the distribution 
of apps but also regarding the payment process. The app developers have only two al-
ternatives: to put up with Apple’s monopolistic practices or leave the App Store entirely. 
2.2.2. Wide definition of relevant market
On the other hand, should consumers be considered as a relevant market in this 
case? Epic’s narrow definition of the relevant market only iOS users and Apple’s App 
Store (rather than app distribution platforms generally) rises a doubt both as a legal and 
factual matter. While the Supreme Court recognized in 1992 a single-brand market in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, the case is widely considered to be an 
outlier in light of subsequent case law (M. Barnett, Jonathan, October 26, 2020). Courts 
have consistently refused to consider one brand to be a relevant market of its own when 
the brand competes with other potential substitutes (United States District Court, Au-
gust 20, 2008 ruling). 
Apple Store may fit into this category. From a different point of view than mention 
previously, the existing and new customers of Fortnite can still access the game through 
multiple platforms and on multiple devices other than the iPhone: PC (including Mac’s 
(macOS)), laptops, game consoles, and non-iOS mobile devices. It is important to men-
tion that Google has also removed Fortnite from the Google Play store related to added 
direct payment feature in the game, yet it is not directly related to the Apple Play store 
and it should not be considered relevant while analyzing the relevant market in this 
case (M. Barnett, Jonathan, October 26, 2020). Therefore, there are other alternative 
distribution channels where Epic Games can reach customers.
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Also, as the statistics show, iOS (Apple) is far more popular in the US than, for exam-
ple, the Android operational system, yet worldwide Android accounts for over 70% 
of mobile users while Apple share accounts for around 25%. Therefore, it is doubtful 
whether it could be concluded that Apple holds a monopoly over the relevant market. 
In the case under analysis, Epic tries to prove the narrow definition of the relevant 
market while Apple holds to the wider understanding. Therefore, if the Court agrees 
with Epic Games that the market is all iOS mobile devices, then Epic should find no 
difficulties to prove that Apple has a complete (or near) monopoly in that market. But 
if the market includes non-iOS mobile devices, as Apple claims, Epic may lose the case. 
As mentioned earlier, Apple’s global market share is only around 25%. In previous cases, 
the Court stated that it is doubtful whether 60% of the market would be enough. There-
fore, 25% percent is not (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, March 12, 1945 
ruling). Consequently, the outcome of the case will depend on which of the Parties will 
prove the definition of the relevant market.
2.3. Is the App Store an essential facility?
Epic’s claim starts with a refusal to supply access to an allegedly essential facility. 
Since iOS is a closed system fully controlled by Apple, access to the Apple Store is in the 
hands of Apple and cannot be achieved without Apple’s approval. The constant refusal 
of Apple to grant it gives rise to a question of whether it controls access to an essential 
facility (Mandrescu, 2020). If the facility is truly essential in this case, a denial of access 
means the monopolist will be immune, at least for some time, to most instances of 
competition (Pitofsky et al., 2002, p. 443)
In general, the essential facility doctrine has been articulated as a subset of the 
so-called “refusal to deal” cases which place limitations on a monopolist’s ability to ex-
clude actual or potential rivals from competing with it. The essential facilities doctrine 
imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second 
firm reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain to com-
pete with the first. Where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be com-
petitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair terms. It is an 
illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the scarce facility. 
Because the doctrine represents a divergence from the general rule that even a mo-
nopolist may choose with whom to deal, courts have established widely adopted tests 
that parties must meet before a court will require a monopolist to grant its competitors 
access to an essential asset. Specifically, to establish antitrust liability under the essential 
facilities doctrine, a party must prove four factors:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility;
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(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
(4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. (Pitofsky et al., 2002, 
p. 448)
Courts rarely impose liability under the essential facilities doctrine, in large part 
because the doctrine requires a showing that the facility controlled by the defendant 
firm is truly essential to competition (Pitofsky et al., 2002, p. 449), not to mention, co-
urts have not applied the essential facilities doctrine to digital platforms The question is 
whether this doctrine could be applied in this case. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze 
whether the Apple App Store (iOS App Distribution Market and the iOS In-App Pay-
ment Processing Market) meet the criteria mentioned above for the essential facility 
doctrine to be applied (Guggenberger, 2020).
2.3.1. Control of the Essential Facility
For a user to download an app into an iOS device, the app must be compatible with 
Apple’s iOS. If an app developer wishes to use iOS, they must enter into Apple’s De-
veloper Agreement. The Developer Agreement requires developers to distribute their 
apps (which are compatible with iOS) solely through the App Store. Therefore, the App 
Store is the sole means by which a third-party developer may distribute apps to iOS 
devices (Ostrowski, 2020). Developers are barred from reaching over one billion iOS 
users unless they go through Apple’s App Store, and on Apple’s terms.
Also, to say whether Apple has control over the essential facility the Court should 
conclude which understanding of the relevant market – wider or narrower – in this 
case, should be applied. If the wider understanding is applied, it is doubtful whether 
the Apple Store should be understood as the essential facility since developers (Epic 
Games included) can reach a wide range of customers through other platforms. If it 
is concluded that the relevant market is iOS consumers (narrow understanding) then 
Apple Store may be considered as the essential facility. 
2.3.2. Inability Practically or Reasonably
to Duplicate the Essential Facility
Apple imposes several technical restrictions in the iOS App Distribution Market:
1. Apple prevents iOS users from downloading App Stores or apps directly from 
websites. Apple has designed technical restrictions. As a result, iOS consumers 
must use Apple’s App Store to download any apps to their devices, app developers 
must use Apple’s App Store to distribute their apps to consumers;
2. Apple pre-installs its App Store on the home screen of every iOS device it sells. 
Apple does not pre-install or allow any competing App Stores anywhere on iOS 
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devices. Apple also disables iOS users’ ability to remove the App Store from their 
devices.
Consequently, it seems that it is impossible to install any other App Store in the iOS 
or download Apps from other sources and it makes Apple’s App Store irreplaceable.
2.3.3. Denial of the Use of the Facility to Competitors
This element may appear uncomplicated when an absolute denial is involved but can 
become complex when a more limited denial is alleged or when parties merely disagree 
on the price or other terms at which access to some asset can be bought (The United 
States Department of Justice, p. 128, cited Werden, supra note 78, at 456). In this case, 
there is a more complex scenario since Epic Games Inc. argues not only denial of access 
but also revenue cuts Apple makes from App developers in its Apple Store.
Epic claimed, that by imposing a 30% tax, Apple necessarily forces developers to 
suffer lower profits, and app developers, who are denied choice on how to distribute 
their apps, are forced to fork over more of their revenue on paid apps than they would 
if Apple faced competition.
Apple tells a different story that there is nothing anticompetitive about charging a 
commission for others to use one’s service. For the more than 80% of apps available to 
consumers for free on the App Store, this means Apple earns no commission what-
soever. Epic wants to change that in ways that would have dire consequences for the 
App Store ecosystem. Therefore, there is a considerable disagreement about the size of 
revenue cuts Apple makes from developers. 
2.3.4. Feasibility of Providing the Facility to Competitors
It is technically feasible for Apple to provide access to iOS to Epic and other app 
distributors, and it would not interfere with or significantly inhibit Apple’s ability to 
conduct its business. But there is another side to it.
The most recent congressional hearing on antitrust which took place on July 27, 
2020, offers insight into the daily data practices of the four data titans, and, of course, 
Apple is one of them (Donewald et al.2020, p. 5). The application of the essential fa-
cilities doctrine in the contexts of digital platforms has often focused on access to the 
(personal) data that these platforms accumulate through the participation of their users 
and business partners (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 23). 
One of the main arguments why Apple’s ecosystem is closed is due to the privacy 
and personal data security Apple holds. It raises various discussions: on the one hand, 
Apple store collected data to serve the interests of stakeholders. On the other hand, with 
the opening of the market to third-party developers, Apple should also open up the 
personal data already collected. 
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There is no doubt data security and privacy is a sensitive topic. Data privacy laws 
often confer individual’s certain data rights: e.g., right to access, right to delete, right to 
data portability, etc. And that raises another question, whether the opening of Apple’s 
ecosystem would not harm iOS user’s right to their data. On January 28, 2021, Apple 
CEO Tim Cook delivered remarks at Computers, Privacy & Data Protection Conferen-
ce: Enforcing Rights in a Changing World. He shared that Apple is deploying powerful 
new requirements to advance user privacy throughout the App Store ecosystem (herei-
nafter – ATT). ATT is about returning control to users about giving them a say over 
how their data is handled. Apps that customers use every day may be passing on infor-
mation about the photos they‘ve taken, the people in their contact list, or location data. 
When ATT is in full effect, users will have a say over this kind of tracking. Technology 
does not need vast troves of personal data stitched together across dozens of websites 
and apps to succeed. 
By being able to hold the most up-to-date information about themselves, indivi-
duals become the ultimate source of truth and thus curtail the dominance of Apple 
and the other three data giants. Furthermore, a user-held data model opens new 
opportunities to third-party developers who can build new types of applications 
that run on top of user-held data without being dependent on the whims of the data 
giants. The new data model levels the playing field among brands and service provi-
ders who would then look for new innovative ways to connect with their customers 
(Donewald et al.2020, p. 19).
In conclusion, Apple has technical measures to make iOS feasible for Epic and other 
apps distributors. However, the principle of proportionality between market opening 
and the sharing of personal users’ data with third parties must be assessed. It is believed 
that the new Apple’s privacy policy requirements will transfer more power to the users 
themselves, so they should decide.
Ultimately, the answer to whether Apple controls an essential facility depends on 
which of the parties will prove the scope of the relevant market: whether Epic will prove 
a narrower concept or whether the Court will believe in Apple’s concept of a broader 
understanding of the relevant market. If the narrower concept and the statement that 
Apple controls about 100% of the relevant market is proven, it is more likely that the 
Court might state that the Apple Play store is not an essential facility and Apple should 
grant access for others to use it.
3. Concise comparative analysis of cases around the world
3.1. Apple’s and Google’s cases
As mentioned earlier, Epic Games filed the complaint blaming Apple for a refusal to 
supply access to an essential facility and rise the discussion of whether Apple controls 
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access to an essential facility (iOS app distribution market). A few days earlier before 
filing the complaint against Apple, Epic Games filed a similar complaint against Google.
Both Apple and Google removed Fortnite from their App Stores for similar reasons: 
there exists guidelines regarding in-app payments that apply to every developer who 
sells digital goods or services on the App Store and the Google Play Store. They state 
that any commerce done within the app must use the default Apple In-App Purchases/
Google In-App billing services as the method of payment. Apps cannot use or link to an 
alternate payment method within the app (Venkatesan, 2020). Epic decided to violate 
these terms of both Apple and Google and installed a direct Epic payment for Fortnite’s 
In-App purchases as illustrated below.
Therefore, both Apple and Google decided to remove Fortnite from their App Sto-
res, and both were sued by Epic Games. Nor both of complaints state that Apple/Google 
have a monopoly over iOS/Android, yet a complaint against Google focuses on foreclo-
sure of access rather than a refusal of access to the essential facility since Android is an 
open-source system and Epic’s claim is not focused on getting access to the ecosystem. 
A foreclosure could be relevant while analyzing the size of revenue cuts Apple makes. 
Therefore, this aspect will be discussed later.
Table No. 3. Differences between closed and open ecosystem
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The reason for that is that Apple and Google have different ecosystems. The main 
difference between iOS and Android is that Android is an open ecosystem and it allows 
apps to be sideloaded onto an Android device without relying on the Play Store. This 
implies that apps can be installed from the internet or other App Stores. Apple does not 
allow apps to be sideloaded onto its iOS devices since the iOS ecosystem is closed. The 
table below indicates the main differences between open and closed ecosystems.
Therefore, it is believed that nor Epic sues Apple and Google on similar grounds, 
which could be summed up as an anti-competitive practice, yet it is believed that Epic’s 
claim against Google is weaker since it has an open ecosystem and has fewer restricti-
ons. Consequently, a different outcome is possible. However, Epic’s case against Google 
is not the main subject of the paper and will not be analyzed further.
3.2. Lessons from spotify
At the EU level, the European Commission (EC) is now “looking in detail into the 
merits of the complaint’ of Spotify against Apple (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 6). Mu-
sic streaming app Spotify has complained that it is being treated unfairly in comparison 
with Apple’s music app because of exorbitant commission fees, delayed approvals, res-
tricted promotions, and limited integration with Apple’s broader ecosystem.
Spotify’s complaints were effective. On 16 June 2020 EC released a press release in-
forming that EC opens investigations into Apple’s App Store rules. It regards similar 
grounds like Epic case: i) The mandatory use of Apple’s in-app purchase system; ii) 
restrictions on the ability of developers to inform users of alternative purchasing possi-
bilities outside of apps. Therefore, this case could set out an example of how Epic’s case 
against Apple could be resolved in the EU.
Article 102 of the Functioning of the European Union (Article 102 (ex Article 82 
TEC)) prohibits abuses of a dominant position. Under the case-law, it is not in itself il-
legal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position and such a dominant undertaking 
is entitled to compete on the merits. However, the undertaking concerned has a special 
responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on 
the common market (Communication from the Commission, 1p.). 
The assessment of dominance will take into account the competitive structure of the 
market, and in particular the following factors:
1. Constraints imposed by the existing supplies from, and the position on the mar-
ket of, actual competitors;
2. Constraints imposed by the credible threat of future expansion by actual compe-
titors or entry by potential competitors;
3. Constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers 
(countervailing buyer power) (Communication from the Commission, 12p.).
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When it comes to the actual competition, market shares are commonly relied upon 
to provide a first indication of the existing market structure and competitive relations. 
While the existence of high market shares is not sufficient to establish dominance, it 
may under certain circumstances sufficient to establish a presumption or at least an 
indication of dominance (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 10).
Based on the data in the Google Android decision, the market share of the Play 
Store exceeds 90%, which is more than sufficient to trigger a presumption of dominan-
ce. In the case of Apple, the market structure is even more clear-cut. Given that each 
ecosystem is considered to be a separate market and the iOS ecosystem is more closed 
than Android (as it does not allow downloading alternative App Stores, nor sideloading 
apps), the market for iOS App Stores is almost completely in the hands of Apple, resul-
ting in a (near) 100% market share (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 11) if we believe that 
narrower understanding of relevant market should be applied.
However, a high degree of market share alone is not sufficient to establish dominan-
ce, particularly in the case of digital platforms that operate on highly dynamic markets. 
Whether Apple is dominant concerning its’ App Store depends on the ability of poten-
tial competitors to enter the market, which is becoming the focus of market power 
assessments in the case of digital platforms (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 11). Whether 
Apple falls under this criteria, it should also be stated which understanding of the rele-
vant market the Court would apply.
The final competitive constrain considered in a market power assessment is coun-
tervailing buying power, which has not yet been extensively discussed in the context of 
digital platforms. For countervailing power to exist, there must be proof of a powerful 
buyer that can constrain price increases by the Apple App Store for the entire market. 
This would require a credible alternative to the App Stores to which an important buyer 
could switch, or otherwise a new entrant that would be sponsored by such a buyer. In 
the case of the Apple App Store, this is difficult to imagine due to the barriers to entry 
discussed earlier (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 13).
In the enforcement of Article 102, the Commission will examine claims put forward 
by a dominant undertaking that its conduct is justified. A dominant undertaking may 
do so either by demonstrating that its conduct is objectively necessary or by demonstra-
ting that its conduct produces substantial efficiencies that outweigh any anti-competiti-
ve effects on consumers (Communication from the Commission, 28p.)
One of the main elements in Spotify’s complaint against Apple concerns the com-
mission fee of 30% (15% after one year), which is levied based on the monthly subscrip-
tion price of Spotify Premium, at least when iOS users subscribe through Spotify’s app 
(rather than its website). The complaint holds that this transaction fee is too high, which 
makes it difficult for Spotify to offer competitive prices to consumers, especially com-
pared to Apple’s music streaming app, Apple Music. From a competition law perspec-
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tive, one may thus ask whether Apple’s commission fee is unfair in the sense of Article 
102(a) TFEU (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 29)
A reasonable approach to excessive pricing in such cases, and particularly in the case 
of Spotify, is to consider the nature of the indirect network effects. In the case of App 
Stores, it is evident that developers are interested in getting access to a great number 
of consumers, so it is reasonable to assume that they would also be willing to finance 
the participation of the latter in the App Store. Furthermore, the App Store operator 
(Apple) also provides developers with many tools and technical support to allow them 
to create apps, to begin with. The costs involved in such activities are also reasonably 
passed on to app developers (Bostoen, Mandrescu, 2020, p. 30).
What remains to be considered is whether such practices could be objectively justi-
fied under art.102 TFEU. The tying of the App Store to iOS is likely to be countered by 
an argument of software security and user protection as these actions allow Apple to 
strictly monitor and filter any potential security threats. At the same time, when consi-
dering the proportionality of such actions, one cannot but ask: is Android so unsafe that 
a complete ban on compatible App Stores or alternative distribution channels is strictly 
necessary? It is unclear, however, to which extent imposing its payment system on app 
developers is necessary for Apple to monetize its App Store and proportionate to the 
competitive concerns it raises.
Nor the investigation is not finished, yet Spotify took an action earlier. Although 
Spotify is currently available to be downloaded to iOS, yet the latest version of this app 
does not allow new users to register and pay a registration fee. Why is that? Spotify 
decided to take such measures in opposition to the commission Apple takes. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that other program developers, especially bigger ones, will not 
take a similar step.
The European Commission has not finished the proceedings over the investigations 
into Apple’s App Store rules. On the other hand, not a long time ago Epic Games sued 
Apple in the United Kingdom, claiming that Apple’s practices are harmful and elimi-
nated competition in-app distribution and payment processes. Unfortunately to Epic, 
United Kingdom’s court ruled in Apple’s favor and refused to force Apple to reinstate 
Fortnite to App Store. As Epic Games said in the statement, it might reconsider pursu-
ing the case against Apple in the United Kingdom after the resolution of the U.S. case. 
Therefore, the dispute against the Parties might not end any time soon.
4. Conclusions and paths forward
1. Apple’s business model has gradually shifted from primarily making and selling 
hardware towards relying more on the services of iPhone users. It seems that 
Apple has created an ecosystem where the vast power over iOS as well as the dis-
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tribution of software applications (apps) and the processing of users’ payments 
for digital content used within iOS mobile apps. 
2. There is no doubt that the after-effects of Epic’s claim will have a huge impact, not 
only on Apple but also on the whole app development and distribution industry. 
3. It is considered that Apple should take action to promote the competition on the 
iOS platform or decrease the commissions since a lot of developers can follow 
Spotify‘s way. 
4. The outcome of this case mostly depends on how the Court will describe the 
relevant market. There are two main possibilities: the Court may be convinced 
by Epic Games that the relevant market consists only of iOS users or it might be 
convinced by Apple that the relevant market is wider and consumers might be 
reached not only by iOS platform but others as well.
5. This dispute is not only a matter of law but also of competition policy. Court has 
to answer from which perspective it will make the assessment. If the court will as-
sess this case from Epic’s perspective, then the likelihood that Epic’s behavior and 
the alternatives available to them show will that it is not a matter of life or death 
for them. However, if the court tries to empathize with the consumer perspective 
(more specifically, Apple consumers), then the probability that the problem will 
be established increases – because consumers have fewer alternatives.
6. There is no legal precedent in similar cases to predict the outcomes of this Court 
decision. However, there is no doubt that this case will have a huge impact on 
how the big tech companies will participate on the platforms. 
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